In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are assigned (non-exclusively) to multiple requests. Each request contributes its weight to the resources it uses and the total load on a resource is then translated to the cost it incurs via a resource specific cost function. Motivated by energy efficiency applications, recently, there is a growing interest in GND using cost functions that exhibit (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS), namely, cost functions that appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads.
and runs in strongly polynomial time; (4) the family of (D)oS cost functions considered in the current paper is more general than the one considered in the existing literature, providing a more accurate abstraction for practical energy conservation scenarios; and (5) we obtain the first approximation ratio for GND with (D)oS cost functions that depends only on the parameters of the resources' technology and does not grow with the number of resources, the number of requests, or their weights. The design of our approximation framework relies heavily on Roughgarden's smoothness toolbox (JACM 2015), thus demonstrating the possible usefulness of this toolbox in the area of approximation algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Generalized Network Design. An instance I of a generalized network design (GND) problem is defined over a finite set E of resources and N abstract requests. Each request i ∈ [N ] is served by choosing some reply p i ⊆ E from request i's reply collection P i ⊆ 2 E . Serving request i with reply p i contributes w i (e) units to the load l e on resource e for each e ∈ p i , where w i ∈ Z E ≥1 is the weight vector associated with request i (specified in I). We emphasize that our GND setting supports unrelated weights, that is, request i may contribute different weights to the load on different resources in p i .
One should serve all the requests of the instance I with replies p = {p i } i ∈[N ] , satisfying p i ∈ P i for every i ∈ [N ], under the objective of minimizing the total cost C (p). This is defined as C (p) = e ∈E F e (l e ), where F e : Z ≥0 → R ≥0 is a resource cost function that maps the load l e = l p e = i ∈[N ]:e ∈p i w i (e) induced by p on resource e to the cost incurred by that resource.
We restrict our attention to GND problems with succinctly represented requests, namely, requests whose reply collections P i can be specified using poly(|E|) bits. These requests are often defined by identifying the resource set E with the edge set of a (directed or undirected) graph G = (V ,E), giving rise to, e.g., the following request types:
• routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a pair (s i ,t i ) ∈ V × V of terminals, the reply collection P i consists of all (s i ,t i )-paths in G; • multi-routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a collection D i ⊆ V ×V of terminal pairs, the reply collection P i consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E such that the subgraph (V , F ) admits an (s,t )-path for every (s,t ) ∈ D i (useful for designing a multicast scheme); 1 and • set connectivity (resp., set strong connectivity) requests in undirected (resp., directed) graphs, where given a set T i ⊆ V of terminals, the reply collection P i consists of all edge subsets that induce on G a connected (resp., strongly connected) subgraph that spans T i (useful for designing an overlay network).
Alternatively, one can identify the resource set E with the vertex set of a graph, obtaining the vertex variants of the aforementioned request types, or with any other combinatorial structure as long as it fits into the aforementioned setting.
(Dis)economies of Scale. The classic network design literature addresses scenarios where the higher the load on a resource is, the lower is the cost per unit load, thus making it advisable to share network resources among requests, commonly known as buy-at-bulk network design [3, 9, 17, 19] . More formally, the cost functions F e (·) in buy-at-bulk network design are assumed to be subadditive, i.e., they exhibit economies of scale. Recently, there is a growing interest in investigating network design problems with superadditive cost functions (i.e., cost functions exhibiting diseconomies of scale) [4, 35] or even cost functions that may appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads [4, 5, 8] , referred to as cost functions exhibiting (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS) [5] . The (D)oS cost functions studied so far in the context of network design capture the energy consumption of network devices employing the popular speed scaling technique [2, 5, 6, 14, 21, 28, 36, 42] that allows the device to adapt its power level to its actual load. Given a global constant parameter α ∈ R >1 (a.k.a. the load exponent), an energy consumption cost function for resource e ∈ E is defined by setting
where σ e ∈ R ≥0 (the startup cost) and ξ e ∈ R >0 (the speed scaling factor) are parameters of e.
We improve the existing results on approximation algorithms for GND with energy consumption cost functions in various aspects (see Sec. 1.1). In fact, our results apply to a more general class of resource cost functions exhibiting (D)oS, referred to as real exponent polynomial (REP) cost functions. Given global constant parameters q ∈ Z ≥1 and α 1 , . . . ,α q ∈ R >1 , a REP cost function for resource e ∈ E is defined by setting
where σ e ∈ R ≥0 and ξ e,1 , . . . ,ξ e,q ∈ R ≥0 are parameters of e, constrained by requiring that ξ e,j > 0 for at least one j ∈ [q]. On top of the theoretical interest in studying more general cost functions, there is also a practical motivation behind their investigation. While some of the theoretical literature on energy efficient network design considers the special case of (1) where σ e = 0 (see Sec. 1.1), it has been claimed [5, 8] that the startup cost component is crucial for better capturing practical energy consumption structures. In fact, in realistic communication networks, even the energy consumption cost functions of (1) may not be general enough since a link often consists of several different devices (e.g., transmitter/receiver, amplifier, adapter), all of which are operating when the link is in use. As their energy consumption may vary in terms of the load exponents and speed scaling factors, the functions presented in (1) do not provide a suitable abstraction for the link's energy consumption and the more general REP cost functions (2) should be employed. Approximation Framework. Our main contribution is a novel approximation framework for GND problems with REP resource cost functions. This framework yields an approximation algorithm when provided access to an appropriate oracle that we now turn to define. A reply ϱ-oracle, ϱ ≥ 1, for a family Q of succinctly represented requests is an efficient procedure that given a resource set E, the reply collection R ⊆ 2 E (specified succinctly) of a request in Q, and a toll function τ : E → R >0 , returns some reply r ∈ R that minimizes the total toll τ (r ) = e ∈r τ (e) up to factor ϱ, i.e., it satisfies τ (r ) ≤ ϱ · τ (r ′ ) for every r ′ ∈ R. An exact reply oracle is a reply ϱ-oracle with ϱ = 1.
Notice that the optimization problem behind the reply oracle is not a GND problem: it deals with a single request (rather than multiple requests) and the role of the resource cost functions (combined with the weight vectors) is now taken by the (single) toll function. In particular, while all the (specific) GND problems mentioned in this paper are intractable (to various extents of inapproximability [4, 13, 37] ), the request classes corresponding to some of them admit exact reply oracles.
For example, routing requests (in directed and undirected graphs) admit an exact reply oracle implemented using, e.g., Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm [23, 25] . In contrast, set connectivity requests in undirected graphs, set strong connectivity requests in directed graphs, and multi-routing requests in undirected and directed graphs do not admit exact reply oracles unless P = NP as these would imply exact (efficient) algorithms for the Steiner tree, strongly connected Steiner subgraph, Steiner forest, and directed Steiner forest problems, respectively. However, employing known approximation algorithms for the latter (Steiner) problems, one concludes that set connectivity replies and multi-routing replies in undirected graphs always admit a reply ϱ-oracle with a constant approximation ratio ϱ, whereas set strong connectivity replies and multi-routing replies in directed graphs admit such an oracle whenever |T | and |D| are fixed [1, 15, 16, 18] . The guarantees of our approximation framework are cast in the following theorem. Theorem 1. Consider some GND problem P with succinctly represented requests using REP resource cost functions as defined in (2) . Suppose that the requests of P admit a reply ϱ-oracle O P . When provided with free access to O P , our approximation framework yields a randomized efficient approximation algorithm A P for P whose approximation ratio is
1/α j with high probability. Moreover, our approximation framework is fully combinatorial and it runs in strongly polynomial time, so if O P is implemented to run in strongly polynomial time, then A P also runs in strongly polynomial time.
We emphasize that when ϱ = O (1), the approximation ratio promised in Thm. 1 becomes
which is free of any dependence on the number |E| of resources, the number N of requests, and the weight vectors {w i } i ∈[N ] ; rather, it depends only on the parameters (σ e , ξ e,j ) of the network resources' technology (speed scaling in case q = 1). Notice that the hidden expressions in our O notations may depend on the parameters q and α 1 , . . . ,α q assumed to be constants throughout this paper.
Comparison to Existing Results
GND with Routing Requests. The existing literature on (generalized) network design beyond subadditive resource cost functions [4, 5, 8, 35] focuses on routing requests, identifying the resources with the edges of a graph, and with the exception of [35] , it is restricted to undirected graphs and related weights, i.e., w i (e) = w i for every e ∈ E. In contrast, the current paper handles a wider class of request types over much more general combinatorial structures (including both directed and undirected graphs) and our approximation framework supports unrelated weights. Moreover, the current paper addresses the general REP cost functions (2), whereas as stated beforehand, the existing literature addresses only the energy consumption cost functions (1) and special cases thereof ( Table 1 summarizes the relevant approximation upper bounds). Specifically, Makarychev and Sviridenko [35] consider purely superadditive cost functions by restricting (1) to σ e = 0 for all e ∈ E, obtaining an approximation ratio of (1 + ϵ )B α , where B α is the fractional Bell number with parameter α. This improves the prior O log α −1 w max upper bound of Andrews et al. [4] , where w max = max i ∈[N ] w i . The case where the startup cost σ e may be positive is addressed by Antoniadis et al. [8] , obtaining an approximation ratio of O (log α N ), but this result is limited to the uniform case where w i = 1 for all i ∈ [N ].
As stated in [5, 8] , for a more accurate abstraction of practical energy conservation scenarios, the cost function definition of (1) with positive startup costs and arbitrary (related) weights is unavoidable. In this setting, three different approximation ratios have been de- [4] ; and polylog(N ) · log α −1 w max in [5] . 2 We emphasize that these three approximation ratios grow with the number N of traffic requests and/or the maximum weight w max , whereas the approximation ratio established in the current paper depends only on the parameters of the network resources' technology. Furthermore, the algorithms behind these approximation ratios are based on linear/convex programming and their (currently known) implementations do not run in strongly polynomial time (this is true also for the algorithm of [35] ). In contrast, the approximation framework developed in the present paper is purely combinatorial with a strongly polynomial run-time. Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines. While GND with routing requests and related weights is a classic problem by its own right, generalizing it to unrelated weights not also makes this abstraction suitable for a wider class of GND scenarios, but also captures the extensively studied problem of scheduling unrelated parallel machines. This problem can be represented as GND with routing requests over a graph consisting of two vertices and multiple parallel edges (referred to as machines) between them. The earlier algorithmic treatment of this problem considers the objective of minimizing the ℓ ∞ norm (a.k.a. makespan) of the machines' load [32, 40] . 3 Later on, the focus has shifted to minimizing the ℓ p norm of the machines' load for p ∈ (1, ∞) [11-13, 31, 35] . The state of the art approximation algorithm in this regard is the one developed by Kumar et al. [31] with a < 2 approximation ratio for all p ∈ (1, ∞). Makarychev and Sviridenko [35] studied this problem for small values of p and designed a p B p -approximation, improving upon the upper bound of [31] for the p ∈ (1, 2] regime.
The ℓ p norm optimization criterion corresponds to the energy consumption cost function (1) restricted to zero startup costs σ e = 0 (energy efficiency is also the main motivation of [35] ). In practice, however, machines' energy consumption typically incurs a positive startup cost [5, 8] . This motivated Khuller et al. [29, 33] to study a variant of unrelated parallel machine scheduling in which the (sub)set of activated machines should satisfy some budget constraint on the startup costs. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper presents the first non-trivial approximation algorithm for scheduling unrelated parallel machines that takes into account the (positive) machines' startup costs σ e > 0 as part of the objective function.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces the concepts and notations used in the design and analysis of the proposed approximation framework. Following that, a technical overview of the approximation framework's design and analysis is provided in Sec. 3. The actual approximation framework is presented in Sec. 4 and analyzed in Sec. 5-7. Two variants of the proposed approximation framework, which are more feasible for a decentralized environment, are presented in the full version [24] . In that full version, we also establish additional bounds that demonstrate the tightness of certain components of the analysis and discuss alternative approaches for designing GND approximation algorithms. In particular, the full version discusses an alternative algorithm for the GND problem with routing requests using convex optimization and randomized rounding.
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout, we consider some GND problem P with succinctly represented requests using REP resource cost functions (2) . Let
, σ e , ξ e,j j ∈[q] e ∈E be some P instance. Let p * be an optimal solution for I and C * = C (p * ) be its total cost.
GND Games and Cost Sharing Mechanisms.
A key ingredient of the approximation framework designed in this paper is a GND game derived from instance I. In this game, each request i ∈ [N ] is associated with a strategic player i that decides on the reply p i ∈ P i serving the request. In the scope of this GND game, the reply p i ∈ P i is referred to as the strategy of player i and the reply collection P i is referred to as her strategy space. We let P = (P 1 , . . . ,P N ) and refer to p = (p 1 , . . . ,p N ) ∈ P as the (players') strategy profile. Although the strategy profile p is a vector of replies, we may slightly abuse the notation and write e ∈ p when we mean that e ∈ i ∈[N ] p i . The cost F e (l e ) of each resource e ∈ E is divided among the players based on a cost sharing mechanism (CSM) M = f i,e (·) i ∈[N ],e ∈E , where f i,e : P → R ≥0 is a cost sharing function that determines the cost share f i,e CSM M = f i,e (·) i ∈[N ],e ∈E is said to be separable and uniform (cf. [20, 41] ) if the cost share of player i ∈ [N ] in resource e ∈ E satisfies (1) if e p i , then f i,e (p) = 0; and (2) f i,e (p) is fully determined by w i (e) and by the multiset of weights of the (other) players using resource e. Notice that f i,e (p) is independent of the identities and weights of the players using any resource e ′ e. It may be convenient to write f i,e (S e ) instead of f i,e (p), where S e = {j ∈ [N ] | e ∈ p j }, although, strictly speaking, f i,e (p) is also independent of the identities (rather than weights) of the players in S e − {i}. Unless stated otherwise, all CSMs considered in this paper are separable and uniform. Best Response. Following the convention in the game theoretic literature, given some i ∈ [N ] and a strategy profile p = (p 1 , . . . ,p N ), let p −i = (p 1 , . . . ,p i−1 ,p i+1 , . . . ,p N ); likewise, let P −i = P 1 × · · · × P i−1 × P i+1 × · · · × P N . Given some approximation parameter χ ≥ 1, strategy p i ∈ P i is an approximate best response (ABR) of player i to p
is an ABR with approximation parameter χ = 1.
A best response dynamic (BRD) (resp., approximate best response dynamic (ABRD)) is an iterative procedure that given an initial strategy profile p 0 ∈ P, generates a sequence p 1 ,p 2 , . . . of strategy profiles adhering to the rule that for every t = 1, 2, . . . , there exists some i ∈ [N ] such that (1) p t −i = p t −1 −i ; and (2) p t i is a BR (resp., ABR) of player i to p t −1 −i . Strategy profile p ∈ P is a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) of the GND game if p i is a BR to p −i for every i ∈ [N ]. The (pure) price of anarchy (PoA) of the GND game is defined to be the ratio C (p)/C * , where p ∈ P is a NE that maximizes the social cost C (p).
Smoothness. The following definition of Roughgarden [38] plays a key role in our analysis: Given parameters λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1, we say that the GND game is (λ, µ)-smooth if
for any two strategy profiles p,p ′ ∈ P. 4 The game is said to be smooth if it is (λ, µ)-smooth for some λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1.
Potential Functions. Function Φ : P → R + is said to be a potential function if for every i ∈ [N ] and for any two strategy profiles p and
A game admitting a potential function is said to be a potential game. The potential function Φ(p) is said to be (A,B)-bounded for some parameters
for any strategy profile p ∈ P. Additional Notation and Terminology. Throughout, we think of ϵ > 0 as a sufficiently small (positive) constant and fix ϵ 1 = 1+ϵ 1−ϵ . A probabilistic event A is said to occur with high probability (w.h.p.) if P(A) ≥ 1 − 1/(|E| + N ) b , where b is an arbitrarily large constant.
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
The key concept in the design of our generic approximation framework is to decouple between the combinatorial structure of the specific GND problem P, captured by the request types (and encoded in the reply collections), and the (D)oS cost functions of the individual resources. Informally, the former is handled by the reply oracle O P (specifically tailored for P), whereas for the latter, we harness the power of Roughgarden's smoothness toolbox [38] . Since this toolbox was originally introduced in the context of game theory rather than algorithm design, we first transform the given P instance into a GND game by carefully choosing the CSM (more on that soon). The algorithm then progresses via a sequence of player individual improvements in the form of a BRD, where each BRD step is implemented by invoking O P with a toll function constructed based on the current strategy profile p ∈ P, the choice of player i ∈ [N ], and her cost sharing functions f i,e (·), e ∈ E (Sec. 4). 5 In order to establish the promised upper bound on the approximation ratio, we first analyze the smoothness parameters of the aforementioned GND game (Sec. 6) which allows us to bound its PoA, thus ensuring that the total cost C (p) of any NE strategy profile p ∈ P provides the desired approximation for the (global) optimum C * . This part of the proof relies on introducing and analyzing a new class of REP-expanded CSMs (Sec. 6), interesting in its own right.
One may hope that a BRD of the GND game converges to a NE strategy profile p ∈ P, but unfortunately, the BRD need not necessarily converge, and even if it does converge, it need not necessarily be in polynomially many steps. Inspired by another component of the smoothness toolbox [38] (which is in turn inspired by [10] ), we show (in Sec. 5) that if the game admits a bounded potential function, then after simulating the BRD for polynomially many steps, one necessarily encounters a strategy profile p ∈ P that yields the promised approximation guarantee (although it is not necessarily a NE).
Does our GND game admit the desired bounded potential function? The answer to this question depends, once again, on the choice of a CSM. We therefore look for a CSM with three (possibly conflicting) considerations in mind: the game that it induces must admit a bounded potential function; it must be REP-expanded; and it must be efficiently computable. We prove that the Shapley CSM satisfies the first two conditions (Sec. 7 and 6, respectively) and although its exact computation is #P-hard, we manage to adapt (in the full version [24] ) the approximation scheme of [34] , originally designed for superadditive cost functions, to accommodate the REP cost functions (2) with positive startup costs σ e > 0. This presents another obstacle though since the original technique of [38] assumes (implicitly) that each step in the BRD is (as the definition implies) an exact BR. To overcome this obstacle, we show that an ABRD is still good enough for our needs (Sec. 5).
We believe that the construction described here demonstrates the usefulness of algorithmic game theory tools for algorithm design even for optimization problems that on the face of it, are not at all concerned with game theory. A similar concept is demonstrated by Cole et al. [22] who obtained an improved combinatorial algorithm for job scheduling on unrelated machines, with the objective of minimizing the weighted sum of completion times, based on the game theoretic tools developed in [10] . In comparison, we employ the smoothness toolbox [38] for the design and analysis of our approximation framework. It is the robustness of this toolbox that plays the key role in the generality of our framework that can be applied to a wide family of GND problems. This is in contrast to most of the existing approximation algorithms for such problems that rely on linear/convex programming and are therefore heavily tailored to one specific GND problem and much less generic.
ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
Let O P be a reply ϱ-oracle for the requests of the GND problem P. Our goal is to design an approximation algorithm with free access to O P as promised in Thm. 1. We shall refer to this approximation algorithm as Alg-ABRD.
Given
, σ e , ξ e,j j ∈[q] e ∈E of P, we first construct (conceptually) the GND game induced by I and a carefully chosen CSM M = f i,e (·) i ∈[N ],e ∈E . On top of the other properties of M that will be discussed in the next sections, we require that M is poly-time ϵ-computable, namely, that given I, p ∈ P, and i ∈ [N ], it is possible to compute in time poly(|E|, N ) some ϵ-cost shares f i,e (p), e ∈ E, that satisfy
w.h.p. Define the ϵ-individual cost C i (p) to be the sum C i (p) = e ∈E f i,e (p), which means that
w.h.p. As we shall perform the computations of the ϵ-cost shares (and the ϵ-individual costs) poly(|E|, N ) times, all of them succeed w.h.p.; condition hereafter on this event.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that the values of the ϵ-cost shares f i,e (p), e ∈ E, and the ϵ-individual costs C i (p) have already been fixed before the algorithm's execution for all i ∈ [N ] and p ∈ P in an (arbitrary) manner that satisfies the aforementioned ϵ-approximation inequalities; the algorithm then merely "exposes" some (poly(|E|, N ) many) of these values. The following lemma plays a key role in the design of Alg-ABRD. Lemma 4.1. If M is a poly-time ϵ-computable CSM, then there exists a randomized procedure that given i ∈ [N ] and p −i ∈ P −i , runs in time poly(|E|, N ) and computes a strategy p i ∈ P i and the corresponding ϵ-individual cost
This means in particular that p i is an ABR of player i to p −i with approximation parameter ϱϵ 1 . 6
Employing the procedure promised by Lem. 4.1, Alg-ABRD simulates an ABRD p 0 ,p 1 , . . . of the GND game induced by I and M that includes at most T iterations for some T = poly(|E|, N ) whose exact value will be determined later. This is done as follows (see also Pseudocode 1).
Set p 0 by taking p 0 i , i ∈ [N ], to be the strategy generated by O P for the toll function τ 0 i defined by setting τ 0 i (e) = F e (w i (e)). Assuming that p t −1 , 1 ≤ t ≤ T , was already constructed, we construct p t as follows. For i ∈ [N ], employ the procedure promised by Lem. 4.1 to compute an ABR p ′ i of player i to p t −1 −i and let
, then the ABRD stops, and we set p t = p t −1 ; in this case, we say that the ABRD converges. Otherwise, fix ∆ t = i ∈[N ] δ t i and choose some player i ′ ∈ [N ] so that
to update her strategy, setting p t = (p ′ i ′ ,p t −1 −i ′ ) (the existence of such a player is guaranteed by the pigeonhole principle).
When the ABRD terminates (either because it has reached iteration t = T or because it converged), Alg-ABRD chooses an iteration t * such that the corresponding strategy profile p t * has a minimum total cost C (p t * ) and outputs p t * . (Recall that in contrast to the player individual costs, the social cost can always be computed efficiently.)
ANALYZING ALG-ABRD
In this section, we begin our journey towards bounding the approximation ratio and time complexity of Alg-ABRD as promised by Thm. 1. The analysis relies on a careful choice of the CSM M = f i,e (·) i ∈[N ],e ∈E . In particular, we are looking for a CSM whose induced GND game is smooth and admits a bounded potential function with the right choice of parameters.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the CSM M is chosen so that the induced GND game admits an (A,B)-bounded potential function Φ and is (λ, µ)-smooth with µ < 1/(ϱϵ 2 1 ) .
In the following sections, we search for a CSM whose induced GND game is (λ, µ)-smooth and admits an (A,B)-bounded potential function for parameters λ, µ, A, and B that when plugged into Thm. 5.1, yield the desired approximation ratio and run-time bounds. 6 All subsequent occurrences of the term ABR (and ABRD) share the same approximation parameter ϱϵ 1 , hence we may refrain from mentioning this parameter explicitly. Algorithm 1 Alg-ABRD 1: Input:
, α j j ∈ [q] , σ e , ξ e,j j ∈[q] e ∈E 2: Output: A profile p ∈ P that is feasible for the given instance for all i ∈ [N ] do 10: set p ′ i to be an ABR of player i to p t −1 −i with approximation parameter ϱϵ 1 11:
SMOOTHNESS OF THE GND GAME
In this section, a rather wide class of CSMs is presented and the smoothness parameters of the induced GND games are analyzed. The proof that an adequate potential function exists for (the GND game induced by) one of these CSMs is deferred to Sec. 7. A CSM (for GND games) is said to be REP-expanded if the cost share f i,e (p) satisfies
x k,j (w i (e)) y k,j , for any player i ∈ [N ], edge e ∈ E, and strategy profile p ∈ P, where K j , 0 ≤ x k,j ≤ α j − 1, 1 ≤ y k,j ≤ α j , and z k,j , k ∈ [K j ], are non-negative constants that can only depend on α j ; moreover, we require that x k,j + y k,j = α j . Note that the exponents x k,j and y k,j and the coefficient z k,j are not necessarily integral. Proof. We begin by observing that (2K j ·z max ) max j α j +1 . Claim 6.3. where ⃗ ξ j , ⃗ l p , ⃗ l p ′ represent the vectors composed from ξ e, j , l p e , and l p ′ e , respectively, for e ∈ p ∩ p ′ , the first transition holds since (l p e ) x k, j = 0 whenever e ∈ p ′ − p, and the third transition follows from Hölder's inequality. Now consider the terms e ∈p ′ ξ e, j (l p e ) x k, j (l p ′ e ) y k, j with x k, j = 0 which means that y k, j = α j since x k, j + y k, j = α j . For these terms, we also have e ∈p ′ ξ e,j (l We proceed to analyze the upper bound on K j k =1 z k,j ϑ j (p)
x k,j α j · ϑ j (p ′ ) y k,j α j by considering the following two cases.
• ϑ j (p) < (2K j z max ϱ) α j · ϑ j (p ′ ): In this case, we have
where the second transition holds because x k,j < α j and 2K j z max ϱ > 1. • ϑ j (p) ≥ (2K j z max ϱ) α j · ϑ j (p ′ ): In this case, we have 
